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ECRITS  LOGIQUES.  By  JACQUES  HERBRAND,  edited  by  JEAN VAN 
HEIJENOORT.  Paris,  Presses Universitaires  de  France,  i968.  Pp.  244. 
24f. 
In the years  1928-1931,  Jacques  Herbrand  developed  an approach  to 
certain  questions  of  mathematical  logic  that  has  greatly  influenced 
many  subsequent  developments  in this field.  Although  he was primarily 
a mathematician (indeed, he is also known for his very important work 
in algebra), his interest and goals in studying logic were based on a 
sensitivity to problems in the philosophy of mathematics. The present 
volume  comprises  all  of his writings  on logic,  including  one  previously 
unpublished  summary  of his work,  plus  several  brief  explanatory  and 
biographical  notes  by  the  editor,  Jean  van  Heijenoort,  and  by  Claude 
Chevalley and Albert Lautman. 
Herbrand's interest in  logic  developed  from reading the Principia 
Mathematica.  For Herbrand, this work furnished empirical evidence that 
mathematics  could  be  formalized  using  relatively  few  primitive 
symbols, axioms, and rules, and hence showed that the formalism of 
Russell and  Whitehead  did  in  fact  capture the  intuitive  notions of 
mathematics. However, he rejected both the philosophical view that 
this furnished a "reduction" of mathematics to logic and the Platonist 
ontology  of  propositional  functions  or  classes.  Rather,  Herbrand 
adopted the position of the Hilbert school: such formalization shows 
that mathematics can be considered as rules for the manipulation of 
combinations of signs, and that the logician's task is the metamathema- 
tical  one  of  studying  these  rules.  Metamathematics,  as  opposed  to 
mathematics, has content; hence, the methods used in this study must 
allow no doubt as to their validity. His explanation of finitism, in "Les 
bases de la logique hilbertienne,"  relies on  intuitive,  common-sense 
notions of rigor and certainty, and ignores the more subtle issues raised 
by  Hilbert and  Brouwer. His formulation, however, makes clear the 
assumptions  about these notions necessary to the finitist viewpoint, and 
avoids the philosophical preconceptions underlying the thought of the 
latter two men. In addition, the simplicity of his exposition occasionally 
enables  Herbrand to  give  a  most  perspicuous statement  to  certain 
issues, such as the difference between mathematical and metamathema- 
tical  induction  that  makes  the  latter  proof-theoretically acceptable 
while the former is not. 
In his technical work, Herbrand added to the finitist program in a 
most important way.  Instead of considering separately the problems 
regarding  decision  procedures  and  consistency,  he  sought  certain 
canonical  syntactic  properties of  the  formulas provable  in  a  given 
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formal system. Results in this vein could then be applied to the two 
problems. His method here shows the other major influence on him, 
that of L6wenheim. L6wenheim, in the proof of the theorem bearing 
his name, used the idea of interpreting existential and universal quanti- 
fiers as infinite disjunctions and conjunctions. Thus, to every formula 
with quantifiers is associated an infinitely long quantifier-free expres- 
sion. Herbrand adapted this notion to a finitist framework  by consider- 
ing  provability,  a  proof-theoretic  property,  instead  of  validity,  a 
model-theoretic one, and by dealing with finite initial segments of the 
infinitely long formulas. In his thesis, "Recherches sur la theorie de la 
demonstration," these procedures  are used to prove results  of the follow- 
ing type: canonically generated sequences of quantifier-free  expressions 
are associated with formulas of quantification theory such that some 
expression from every such sequence is truth-functionally valid if the 
formula is provable in quantification theory. Furthermore, from the 
proof of  the  original formula, the  quantifier-free expression that  is 
truth-functionally valid can be effectively obtained. 
In this thesis and the subsequent papers. "Sur le problem  fonda- 
mental de la logique mathematique" and  "Sur la non-contradiction 
de l'arithmetique," Herbrand applied these results to the decision and 
consistency problems of certain formalisms. As a consequence, he was 
able not only to obtain more powerful theorems than had previously 
been proven, but also to furnish a more unified and finitistic approach 
to these problems by  considering the syntactic properties with which 
he had dealt in "Recherches." 
Unfortunately, these technical papers are densely written and con- 
tain  numerous obscurities. Furthermore, there is  a  crucial error in 
"Recherches" which invalidates the proof that every provable formula 
has a truth-functionally valid Herbrand expansion. This error was not 
corrected until recently, by Burton Dreben, although weaker versions 
of the theorem were proved by other methods. The correction appears 
among the notes to the translation  of Chapter 5 of "Recherches" in van 
Heijenoort's From Frege to GUdel:  A  Sourcebook  in Mathematical  Logic 
(Cambridge, Mass.,  i967).  With regard to other difficulties in under- 
standing Herbrand's proof, van Heijenoort's introduction to the Ecrits 
not only explains the error, but also gives a useful survey of Herbrand's 
work and the subsequent history of studies of Herbrand's method. The 
volume is not intended as a critical edition, however, and most of the 
specific obscurities are not elucidated. Hence, it is almost a necessity to 
read  the  above-mentioned  notes  and  translation  of  Chapter  5  of 
"Recherches." 
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Herbrand's writings have influenced the subsequent development of 
logic  in  several ways. The  strategy of finding cut-free proofs of the 
theorems  of  a  formal  system,  which  gained  prominence  through 
Gentzen's papers and lies at the heart of much work in proof theory, 
is in fact due to Herbrand; the Herbrand expansion method provides 
such proofs for theorems of quantification theory. Second, the idea of 
reducing quantified provable formulas in some manner to quantifier- 
free, finitistically provable ones formed the basis of the E-theorems  of 
Hilbert  and  Bernays and,  in  turn inspired by  these,  the  theory of 
interpretations as developed by Kreisel. More technically, Herbrand's 
specific ideas, in particular the use of Herbrand expansions, have been 
extended; a forthcoming monograph by Dreben, Denton, and Scanlon, 
The Herbrand  Theorem  and the Consistency  of Number  Theory,  is a detailed 
study  of  this.  Finally,  Herbrand's method  provides much  material 
regarding proof procedures, elimination of quantifiers, and so on, and 
suggests questions which have not yet been explored. 
WARREN  D.  GOLDFARB 
Harvard  University 
PHILOSOPHICAL  PROBLEMS  AND  ARGUMENTS.  By  JAMES 
W.  CoRNMAN and  KEITH  LEHRER.  New  York,  The  Macmillan 
Company,  I968. PP. xii, 462. $5.95. 
Texts  for introductory philosophy courses fall  roughly into  three 
classes: anthologies, introductory surveys, and classics. Each approach 
has its advantages and problems. In an anthology views are presented 
by the philosophers who really hold them. Students are introduced to 
thinkers they may study more deeply later. But the papers are often 
intended for a sophisticated audience; variations in style, terminology, 
and approach put irrelevant difficulties in the way of understanding. 
Classics have the advantage of being classics: they are worth reading 
for themselves, and not just as introductions to something else. But as 
introductions  they  are  often  one-sided.  The  philosophical  level  of 
introductory surveys is often low. Even the best are dull. 
Cornman and Lehrer have written a text that has some of the advan- 
tages of anthologies and classics, and avoids some of the shortcomings 
of  the  usual introductory survey. The  authors present the  material 
dialectically, enabling them to state in a very thorough and generally 
fair way the main positions on each problem discussed, so the student 
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